BIDDING POTEKTIAL FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND
The size structure of farms, the control of farming, and the future of the family farm are issues that are all related to the ownership and control of a unique rural resource--land. The future complexion of the U. S. countryside is intimately tied to the ability of different economic groups to gain and maintain control of the land base. Con tinuation of past trends in farm enlargement and off-farm migration would vest the control of the farming community in fewer and larger operating units. Krause and Kyle (pp. 752-755) have outlined many of the incentives for further potential Increases in the incidence of large farming units:
(1) production and marketing economies, (2) management expertise, (3) tax incentives, (4) nonfarm investment, (3) specializa tion, and (6) conglomeration. Armstrong acknowledges these incentives, but also cites potential limits or impediments that may temper the continued trend toward larger units:
(1) managerial talent availabil ity, (2) problems of coordination and supervision, (3) capital avail ability, (4) labor availability, and (5) risk and uncertainty.
While previous studies have identified some important aspects of the farm size and control Issues, the extant literature provides no overall theoretical framework within which to incorporate these key incentives and diseconomies. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical
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-2-approach that can be used to determine the relationship between land ownership and the various characteristics of existing farm size classes, It is assumed that the future ownership of land will be determined by the relative bidding potential of participants in the land market.
A theoretical model of maximum bid-price is developed in Section I and discussed in Section li. In Section III, an application of the model is made to cash-grain farms in Iowa. Finally, in Section IV, a summary and some conclusions of the study are offered.
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I, Theoretical Model
The basis for the developinent of a theoretical model of bidding potential is provided by Pratt. In his fonnulation of a measure of the degree of risk aversion, he defines the bid price as the largest amount a decision maker would willingly pay to obtain a risk (p. 124).
This bid price is given by the equation (1) u(x) = E lu(x + z -B)
where x represents the level of assets held by the decision maker;
u, his utility function; E, the expected value operator; z, the risk; and B, the bid price.^In this analysis, x will be interpreted as the level of net worth of the decision maker and z as a random variable denoting the value of an acre of land. The term B then represents the maximum price a decision maker would be willing to pay for that acre.
By using a Taylor expansion to expand u around x (Yamane, pp. 280-281),
an approximation for the bid price can be derived from the quadratic equation
where u'(x) and u"(x) are the first and second derivatives of the utility 2 function, and E(z) and cj are, respectivel)^the expected value and z variance of the value of an acre of land.
By utilizing Pratt's measure of risk aversion (p. 125) If, however, z is defined as the discounted value of future income from an acre of land and is derived from a standard perpetuity model 2 incorporating a constant rate of growth, the value of an acre of land can be defined as
where y represents a random before-tax income stream, t is the marginal income tax rate of the decision maker, g is the expected rate of growth of after-tax income, and i is the decision maker's discoimt rate for 2 pure time preference. Then E(z) and <7 #respectively become z (6) E(z) = E(y)
L(i -g) J y
Substituting (6) and (7) into (4), gives
<yt + Uy)
Now, the maximum bid price B is defined in terms of the parameters of the utility function (through the measure of the degree of risk and solving for the effects on B of changes in E(y), x, r(x), t, i, and g. Thus,
dB_^_ r(x)(l -t) < Q 
The sign of dB/dt is ambiguous because a change in the marginal tax rate influences the bid price in two ways. An increase in the marginal tax rate will (1) decrease the bid price through a reduction in expected after-tax income from an acre of land, but (2) increase the bid price through a reduction in the variability of after-tax income.
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The signs of dB/di and dB/dg likewise are ambiguous without knowl edge of the sizes of the parameters in the model. The effect of \ i and g on the bid price, however, will be of equal magnitude but opposite sign.
Interpretation of equations (9) - (15) Table 1 ).
Data
Various sources of data were used in an attempt to define the characteristics of the average cash-grain farmer in each size category.
Estimates were necessary for E(y), t, i, g, x, and r(x) for each size classification.
Expected before-tax income The expected before-tax income per acre for 1970, E(y), was based on the 1969 average as derived from Census data. Expected before-tax net income attributable to ownership of an acre of land was estimated by summing the market value of all agricultural products sold and receipts from government farm programs, subtracting total farm production expenses, and dividing the result by the total number of acres in cash-grain farms (lines 4-9, Appendix), experxence on the generation of expected growth rates, a geometrically declining weighted average was used.
Because of lack of information on differences among size classes in rates of pure time preference and expected growth rates, it was assumed that those rates were the same for all groups (lines 5-6, Unfortunately, equity levels were not directly available for cashgrain class sizes from the Finance Survey. Estimates, however, were made on the basis of the assumption that the ratio of average cash-grain equity to average equity for all farms could be extended across classes.
Thus, it was assumed that, If the average cash-grain farm had twice the equity of the average equity of all farms, then the average Class II cash-grain farm would have twice the equity of the average Class II farm In general. Applying this allocation procedure to the equity figures calculated for all operators gave equity levels ranging from over $230,000 for Class 0 cash-grain farms to less than $50,000 for Class IV cash-grain farms (line 7, Table 1 ).
Degree of Risk Aversion
To calculate a measure of the degree of risk aversion, r(x), it was necessary to estimate a utility function With the three quadratic utility function cases of LDM, data points were generated over the range from $0 to $100,000 in order to 9 create a composite scatter diagram between utility and monetary value.
A new composite utility function was then estimated through these data points.
A simple Cobb-Douglas form was chosen for the estimation of utility as a function of wealth (x) because it avoids the problem of ranges of decreasing marginal utility. The resulting composite utility function was (16) u = 35.6518x°"^°^^= .93 t = 28.28
The value for the degree of risk aversion was obtained by solving equation (3) from Class IV to Class 0 respectively (line 8, Table 1 ).
-17-Bld price solutions and differences
Solutions of equation (8) using the farm class characteristics given in Table 1 give a range of maximum bid prices from $533 per acre 10 for Class I farms to $231 per acre for Class IV farms (line 9, Table 1 ).
In order of bidding potential, the classes rank from highest to lowest as I, II, 0, III, IV. The surprising result is that the largest class size. Class 0, falls in the middle of the biddingpotential range.
To try to isolate the relative importance of the class size characteristics on the bid-price differentials between classes, bid prices were calculated by using incremental changes in characteristics.
Results are shown in Table 2 . For exanq)le, line 1 of Table 2 Finally, the importance of size and the degree of risk aversion can be assessed by comparing the calculated bid prices with those that would pertain to a risk-neutral decision maker. If the decision maker is risk neutral, r(x) =0 and the maximum bid price in (8) would be given by (18) B= (1 I g) E(y).
Comparisons of calculated bid prices using the utility function given in equation (16) with those using any risk-neutral utility function are given in Table 3 . The difference between the bid prices represents the risk premium required by the decision maker. In general, the size of the risk premium increased as the farm size declined. Note that the bid prices for risk-neutral Class III and IV farmers are less than those for risk-averse Class 0, I, and II farmers. The trend of the last two decades to larger and larger farming units has been viewed by n^ny as a threat to the family farm. Dis agreement exists as to whether that trend will continue. The analysis in this paper was based on the assumption that the future control of farming will be vested in those farmers with the greatest bidding potential for agricultural land. A theoretical model was developed to explore some of the important variables affecting that bidding potential, and a numerical example of the model was developed for cash-grain farms in Iowa.
The theoretical model was constructed to determine the maximum bid-price that would be made for an acre of land by a decision maker with a given set of characteristics, capabilities, and expectations.
The variables included that have an ln5)act on the maximum bid price are
(1) before-tax net income per acre, (2) variability of income per acre, (3) initial net wealth position, (4) degree of risk aversion, (5) marginal income tax rate, (6) required rate of return on invest ment, and (7) expected rate of growth in land income and prices.
As such, the model is capable of incorporating most arguments that are typically advanced for or against the continued growth of farming units. If it can be assumed, however, that wealth is a discounted series of future income streams, wealth is but a linear transformation of income. Although the parameters of the utility function over wealth will be different from those of the utility function over income, the risk function r(x) will be invariant with respect to income and wealth, 9, The linear cases of LDM were eliminated since they are but a special case of equation (8), where r(x) = 0, Also, the cubic equation was eliminated because its data points deviated so drastically from those generated by the other risk functions. Finally, the range of monetary values was terminated at $100,000 to avoid data points that represented decreasing marginal utility of wealth.
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The average value of cash-grain farmland reported in the 1969
Census was $434 per acre. In an auction system, the market price will not be equal to the maximum bid price. Theoretically, it should be one bid unit higher than the second highest maximum bid price of the participants in the auction. The difference between the maximum bid price of the purchaser and the actual purchase Hence, the smaller risk premium than for adjacent size classes.
